The Massachusetts legislature ended its session without taking action on competing bills limiting non competition agreements in the House and Senate. This is probably a good thing because the discussion regarding the bills has not been substantive. The venture capital industry supporting a limitation and the business community opposing the limitation have both resorted to specious arguments. I discuss the pros and cons of eliminating or limiting non competes in my posts of June 25, 2015 and September 14, 2013 below.
I have had very few clients involved in family businesses, which businesses have succeeded to the second generation. Some of my clients have been children who have been “frozen out” of the business by their siblings, sometimes to the dismay of the founder. Sometimes the second generation hasn’t a clue to how the business is run.
The owners of a successful business should begin at least 10 years before they plan to turn over the reins, to implement a realistic plan for succession. By realistic I do not mean including, in future management, the child still in kindergarten or believing, that the child who is successful educator, will suddenly see the light, and join the business. It may be that the best course is sale of the business, insuring a safe retirement and perhaps a cash gift to the second generation.
There are some interesting stories at Lifting the Second-Generation Curse. You can find a link to that article which appeared in The New York Times at my Twitter account @EdPolubinski
Crowdfunding was authorized by the JOBS Act enacted on April 5, 2012. The SEC adopted regulations implementing the crowdfunding portions of the Act on October 30, 2015, and those regulations became effective on May 16, 2016. The release adopting the regulations was 685 pages long but the rules adopted are not all that complicated. The following is a brief and general discussion of those regulations.
Crowdfunding will be of use to issuers who want to raise smaller amounts of capital (up to $1 Million in any 12 month period).
An individual’s investment in any 12 month period in all crowdfunding issuers is limited to:
(i) The greater of $2,000 or 5 % of the lesser of the investor’s annual income or net worth if either the investor’s annual income or net worth is less than $100,000; or
(ii) 10 % of the lesser of the investor’s annual income or net worth, not to exceed an amount sold of $100,000, if both the investor’s annual income and net worth are equal to or more than $100,000.
During any 12 month period, the aggregate amount of securities sold to an investor through all crowdfunding offerings may not exceed $100,000.
Certain companies are excluded from participating in in raising funds by crowdfunding,
Generally, securities purchased in a crowdfunding offer may not be resold for a period of one year.
The issuer must make disclosure about the business, use of proceeds, etc. similar to that which an issuer must make under Regulation D. This is something that the company should not try at home; this disclosure is difficult and precise work. Disclosures of this sort have followed a pattern and it would be wise to follow that pattern. The disclosures are an “insurance policy.”
The standard for financial statements depends upon the amount of the offering.
There are filing requirements and ongoing reporting requirements. Advertising is restricted.
Finally, the crowdfunding must be conducted exclusively through an SEC registered intermediary—either a SEC registered broker—dealer or a “portal.” If you call, I can give you the names of several “portals.”
Every corporation having multiple shareholders should have a buy-sell or similar agreement covering what happens upon a shareholder’s exit. Such an agreement not only provides the shareholders and the corporation with a plan of succession but also provides for what happens if the exit is due to termination of a shareholder’s interest. Termination might include, for instance, a termination due to resignation or firing, retirement, or a desire by the majority to “buy out” a minority shareholder, as well as the death of a shareholder. Such an agreement should provide for a buyout plan of payment that will not cripple the remaining shareholders or the corporation. If properly done the agreement will also vitiate any rights the departing partner has to recover damages in a lawsuit under the expansive Massachusetts doctrine of “breach of fiduciary duty.”
But what if a corporation does not have such an exit or buyout plan or the corporation underestimates the financial effect of an exit? The article here, which was recently appeared in The New York Times, offers some interesting ways for the corporation or its dominant shareholder to finance the exit or buyout.
Over the years, I have served on boards of directors of a number of my clients. I have done so at the request of clients or boards, for many reasons, among them “balancing” the board which otherwise would have been skewed in favor of a venture capitalist and providing “free” legal advice to non profit boards (even significant sized non profits). I have found this dual service –board membership/legal counsel to be highly rewarding. Dual service, however, opens up some interesting potential conflicts. A recent article in The New York Times discusses those issues in relation to David Boies’s service as counsel and director of Theranos. I disagree with one of the author’s premises—that a director owes his/her duty to investors. In Massachusetts corporations, he or she owes that duty to the corporation, not just its “investors.” Mass. G. L. c. 156D, § 8.30 (a) (3). [1] That said, the general point of the article deserves to be considered.
Traditionally Massachusetts lawyers serve in the office of secretary of their corporate clients. I have done this and will continue to do so for a number of reasons, not the least of which is to make sure that the corporation’s acts are properly authorized by directors. Yet this service may expose the attorney to analogous conflicts. The standard of conduct for officers in a Massachusetts corporation is similar to that of the standard for directors. Mass. G. L. c. 156D, § 8.42.
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[1] That subsection provides that a director must act:
in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. In determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, a director may consider the interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the state, the region and the nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
A recent decision[1] by Judge Stearns of the U. S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts demonstrates that companies should periodically examine their IP protection. In that case, an employee signed an employment agreement with a company in 2005. That agreement stated that “[t]he following are the terms of employment. . . You will be required to endorse the ‘Confidentiality and Non Compete Agreement’ enclosed.” Later, in 2012, the employee signed a new employment agreement which made no reference to any confidentiality or non competition provisions.
The court concluded that the language of the 2012 agreement precluded application of the 2005 ‘Confidentiality and Non Compete Agreement’ as a matter of law. The Court stated that there was no factual question as to whether the parties intended that the 2005 ‘Confidentiality and Non Compete Agreement’ to apply to the 2012 employment agreement, because:
“The 2012 employment agreement states on its face that it contains “the terms of [the employee’s] employment” without any reservation or reference to any other document or agreement.”
Thus, the provisions of the 2005 ‘Confidentiality and Non Compete Agreement’ were extinguished by the 2012 agreement.
This case appears specific to its facts. The lesson, however, is that a company’s IP protection should be periodically reviewed to avoid problems of non enforceability. Two further examples illustrate this. I recently looked at a company’s confidentiality agreement and concluded that because it applied to three different situations, three separate types of contracts were necessary; we therefore changed the company’s IP protection system. Second, as I have previously blogged, the whole field of non competition agreements is constantly being reviewed for change by the Massachusetts legislature. I have drafted certain IP protection agreements in anticipation of such a change.
[1] Meschino v. Frazier Industrial Company, 2015 WL 7295463 (D. Mass. 2015).
The SEC has adopted new crowdfunding rules. They are somewhat complex but will offer the smaller venture a safer way to accomplish a “friends and family” offering. The rules will also give that venture other sources of capital. Crowdfunding may, in addition, give, to those so inclined, a new avenue for fraud. An article in The New York Times, here, gives an overview and I give you a link to the text of the regulation. The release is long but the rule is not really that complex. I plan to post a blog on the effect of the new rule of the SEC upon the existing Massachusetts crowdfunding rules soon.
I am representing two individuals who had made an investment in a start up venture. The projections of the principals of the venture were, to be charitable, optimistic. The litigation resulting from this investment has been horrendously expensive (over $300,000 to date) and has taken a toll on everyone concerned. It is far better to do due diligence on an “Angel Investment” in advance. The article “Tips for the Aspiring Angel Investor” in a recent issue of The New York Times, which I attach a link to is helpful.
In addition, the venture seeking investors in a traditional private placement would be wise to prepare a disclosure document at least explaining the investment and outlining its risks. The venture, its principals and its advisor in the aforementioned case have incurred significant legal fees in litigation of the matter over a period, so far, of almost four years. On the other hand, I participated in drafting a private placement memorandum of a venture that went bust, therein explaining the investment and setting forth risks. After the venture’s demise, an investor complained to a securities regulator. The regulator examined the offering materials and took no action against the venture, its principals or advisors. A properly drafted offering memo is pretty cheap insurance.
Minority shareholders in closely held corporations are frequently denied information necessary to determine whether there is wrongdoing by entrenched management. The shareholder may suspect that there is wrongdoing but cannot elicit sufficient evidence. Fortunately the Massachusetts corporate statute enables a shareholder to readily and effectively get a wide variety of information about the shareholder’s corporation. This right can be enforced in the courts.
By statute, a shareholder may inspect and copy the following records of the corporation, during regular business hours, at the place where the records are kept, on 5 business days’ written notice:
- its charter documents
- its bylaws and amendments,
- resolutions of the board creating stock and fixing shareholder rights,
- shareholder minutes for the past 3 years,
- a list of the names and business addresses of its directors and officers, and
- a copy of its most recent annual report filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
There is no requirement that the shareholder make any showing of purpose or the like. The shareholder is simply entitled to these records. This right, however, is relatively meaningless because, except for the bylaws and their amendments, all of this information may be gleaned on line primarily from the Secretary of the Commonwealth’s website.
But there is a more substantial right granted by the statute. A shareholder is entitled to inspect the following, during regular business hours, at a location specified by the corporation, upon 5 business days’ written notice, the following:
- excerpts of directors’ (including committees) and shareholders’ actions,
- accounting records of the corporation.[1] and
- the shareholder list required to be kept by law.
The catch, is that to receive these records the shareholder must demonstrate:
- That the shareholder’s request is made “in good faith and for a proper purpose”,
- That the request describes with “reasonable particularity” the purpose and the records to be inspected, and that the records are directly connected with the shareholder’s purpose.
Even if the shareholder demonstrates the foregoing, the records may be produced only if corporation hasn’t determined in good faith that disclosure of the records would adversely affect the corporation’s business.[2]
The two battleground areas are (a) what is “in good faith and for a proper purpose” for inspection and (b) what type of information would, if disclosed, adversely affect the corporation’s business.
What then is a “in good faith and for proper purpose”? The drafters of the statute stated that “the phrases . . . are traditional and well understood”. “A ‘proper purpose’ means a purpose that is reasonably relevant to the demanding shareholder’s interest as a shareholder.”
Obtaining a shareholders’ list for the solicitation of proxies in order to change management was deemed a “proper purpose”. On the other hand, obtaining a shareholders’ list to determine if others were willing to sell the shareholder stock was not. This demand was for “personal investment concerns” not related to the shareholder’s interest as a shareholder in the corporation. Seeking a list to contact other shareholders to elect a management that would seek a merger is a “proper purpose”. That is an interest of the shareholder in the corporation.
A shareholder without a “proper purpose” should check the corporation’s bylaws (or articles of organization, both of which can be obtained without the showing of “proper purpose”). Although the right cannot be limited by the bylaws (or articles), it can be expanded to require less than the “proper purpose” or for that matter no purpose.
The second caveat is that a corporation need not disclose information that adversely affects its business. There is little in the way of reported decisions on what type of information adversely affects business. I had, however, some success in prohibiting disclosure to a shareholder who had a competing business.
In the event that the foregoing statutory right does not give the shareholder the information desired there is a “common law” right for inspection. The breadth of that right has not been fully determined and, of that matter, that right has not been defined in recent reported decisional law.
[1] If financial statements are audited, inspection is limited to the financial statements and the supporting schedules reasonably necessary to verify any line item thereon.
[2] In the case of a public corporation, also excluded is information which would constitute “material non-public information”, at the time the request was made.
On July 1, 2015 the Massachusetts Earned Sick Time Law took effect implementing Ballot Question 4, which required an employer to provide its employees with sick leave benefits. The act requires an employer with eleven or more employees to provide its employees with 40 hours of PAID sick leave per year. Two of my clients that had 10 or fewer employees did not realize that they were required to provide 40 hours of UNPAID sick leave a year on basically the same terms as paid leave. Frankly, I was unaware of the breadth of the act’s application until an associate of the firm, Kate Buyuk, and I were working on a project related to the act on behalf of one of my clients.
This post is a brief summary and is intended only to alert business owners to the act and some of its requirements. The act and the attorney general’s regulations are detailed and someone familiar with its requirements should at least review an employers’ compliance. The requirements set forth in the act and regulations are a minimum and an employer’s plan may provide greater benefits. The highlights of the act’s and regulations’ requirements for both paid and unpaid sick leave follow.
Sick leave may be used:
- To care for the employee’s child, parent, spouse or parent of a spouse suffering from a physical or mental illness, injury or medical condition which requires home care, professional medical diagnosis or care, or preventive medical care,
- To care for the employee’s own physical or mental illness, injury or medical condition which requires home care, professional medical diagnosis or care, or preventive care,
- To attend a routine medical appointment for the employee or the employee’s child, spouse, parent or parent of a spouse,
- To address the physical, legal or psychological effects of domestic violence,
- To travel to an appointment, pharmacy or other location related to the purpose for which the sick leave was taken.
Employers with 11 or more employees must provide PAID sick leave and employers with 10 or fewer employees must provide UNPAID sick leave.
Employees must earn an hour of sick leave for every 30 hours worked if their primary place of employment is in Massachusetts, up to a maximum of 40 hours of leave per year. An employee may begin to use accrued sick leave on the 90th day after hire and, thereafter as accrued. Employees may carry-over sick leave, but cannot use more than 40 hours in any year.
The act and attorney general’s regulations contain detailed requirements for employee documentation of sick leave. They also detail the way sick leave may be calculated and who may be a covered “employee.” Additional refinements, however, will be necessary to clarify some unclear areas.
An employer may require an employee to verify in writing that the employee is using sick leave for an approved purpose and the attorney general has adopted an acceptable form. We recommend its use verbatim. There is an “official notice” that should be posted in all Massachusetts workplaces.
The act and regulations provide very detailed requirements for an employer’s plan. In addition to providing requirements for a plan, the act and regulations have prohibitions against retaliatory acts and actions against employees regarding sick leave.
The attorney general was given broad rulemaking and enforcement powers by the act.
